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The emergence of two distinct leadership roles, the task leader and the socio-emotional
leader, has been documented in the leadership literature since the 1950s. Recent research
in neuroscience suggests that the division between task-oriented and socio-emotional-
oriented roles derives from a fundamental feature of our neurobiology: an antagonistic
relationship between two large-scale cortical networks – the task-positive network (TPN)
and the default mode network (DMN). Neural activity in TPN tends to inhibit activity in
the DMN, and vice versa. TheTPN is important for problem solving, focusing of attention,
making decisions, and control of action. The DMN plays a central role in emotional self-
awareness, social cognition, and ethical decision making. It is also strongly linked to
creativity and openness to new ideas. Because activation of the TPN tends to suppress
activity in the DMN, an over-emphasis on task-oriented leadership may prove deleterious to
social and emotional aspects of leadership. Similarly, an overemphasis on the DMN would
result in difﬁculty focusing attention, making decisions, and solving known problems. In
this paper, we will review major streams of theory and research on leadership roles in the
context of recent ﬁndings from neuroscience and psychology.We conclude by suggesting
that emerging research challenges the assumption that role differentiation is both natural
and necessary, in particular when openness to new ideas, people, emotions, and ethical
concerns are important to success.
Keywords: leadership, roles, neural networks and behavior, DMN,TPN, anti-correlated networks, opposing domains
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INTRODUCTION
The emergence of two distinct leadership roles, the task leader and
the socio-emotional leader, has been documented in the leadership
literature since the 1950s (Bales, 1958). The separation of these
roles has been seen as pragmatic in applications and is accepted
as a ﬁnding in behavioral research. However, in practical applica-
tions, it leaves an organization with a challenge that can detract
from leadership development, succession planning, and organi-
zational ﬂexibility. In this article, we will show that the division
between these two types of leadership roles lies far deeper than has
traditionally been thought. Recent research in neuroscience sug-
gests that the division between task-oriented and socio-emotional
leadership roles derives from a fundamental feature of our neu-
robiology: an antagonistic relationship between two large-scale
cortical networks that is present in every individual.
Neural activity in the task-positive network (TPN) tends to
inhibit activity in the default mode network (DMN; Raichle et al.,
2001; Fransson, 2005; Raichle and Snyder, 2007; Buckner et al.,
2008), and vice versa (Uddin et al., 2009; Jack et al., 2012). The
TPN is activated during a broad range of non-social tasks (Fox
et al., 2005; Buckner et al., 2008; Uddin et al., 2009; Andrews-
Hanna, 2012), and is thought to be important for problem solving,
focusing of attention, making decisions, and control of action –
in other words for getting things done. However, activation of the
TPN also has a deleterious effect on other cognitive functions that
are essential to leadership: it suppresses activity in the DMN.
The DMN plays a central role in emotional self-awareness
(Ochsner et al., 2005; Schilbach et al., 2008), social cognition
(Schilbach et al., 2008; Jack et al., 2012; Mars et al., 2012), and
ethical decision making (Koenigs et al., 2007; Bzdok et al., 2012;
Jack et al., in press). It is also strongly linked to creativity and
insightful problem solving (Subramaniam et al., 2009; Takeuchi
et al., 2011). The antagonistic relationship between the TPN
and DMN creates a fundamental neural constraint on cogni-
tion that is highly relevant to the different roles and capabilities
that effective leaders must astutely juggle and deploy. An impor-
tant consequence of this constraint is that an over-emphasis on
task-oriented leadership can prove deleterious to an organiza-
tion: in particular when openness to new ideas, people, emotions,
and ethical concerns are important to success. On the other
hand, the over emphasis on relationship oriented leadership may
prove deleterious to focus and the execution of clearly deﬁned
goals.
We are not the ﬁrst to note the striking correspondence between
the functions of brain networks and leadership. In a recent book,
social neuroscientist Matthew Lieberman distinguishes between
the social brain and thebusiness brain anddoesnote the antagonis-
tic relationship between the TPN and the DMN (Lieberman, 2013,
p. 257). In this paper, we extend Lieberman’s preliminary work by
providing amore nuanced account of the antagonistic relationship
between the TPN and the DMN and their corresponding task and
relationship leadership roles. We then extend Lieberman’s work by
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theorizing strategies that will allow leaders to effectively navigate
this fundamental cognitive constraint.
OPPOSING NEURAL DOMAINS
When discussing the functional anatomy of the brain, it is
important to appreciate that the literature is less clear than is
often acknowledged. The cognitive characterization of the ten-
sion between the DMN and the TPN that guides this inquiry is
different in important respects from the view that is frequently
stated as accepted and uncontroversial (including in the context
of leadership, e.g., Waytz and Mason, 2013). Nonetheless, as we
will brieﬂy review, the characterization we offer is better sup-
ported by the scientiﬁc evidence. A number of inconsistencies
in the literature facilitate misunderstanding and over-conﬁdence:
ﬁrst, anatomical labels are not always used consistently and some-
times fail to distinguish areas which careful evidence reveals have
quite distinct functional roles (Kubit and Jack, 2013). Second,
researchers working with different types of cognitive tasks often
form quite different views about the primary functional role
of a region or a set of regions (i.e., a network). In particular,
it is now well acknowledged that researchers have not always
been careful to critically evaluate the evidence supporting their
inferences about the functional role of brain areas, and some-
times fail to consider evidence about function that derives from
a broader view of the literature (Henson, 2006; Poldrack, 2011).
Third, networks can be deﬁned according to a number of different
criteria.
The issue of how networks can be deﬁned is important to clar-
ify for our purposes. Networks of regions are most often deﬁned
(and given a label denoting a provisional functional role) either
because: (1) they are frequently found to be activated by a class
of cognitive tasks (Corbetta et al., 1998; Duncan and Owen, 2000;
Van Overwalle, 2009); or (2) the regions demonstrate strong posi-
tive resting state connectivity with each other – a ﬁnding which is
commonly interpreted as indicating a degree of functional coher-
ence amongst the regions in the network (Fox et al., 2005; Cohen
et al., 2008; Vincent et al., 2008; Van Dijk et al., 2010; Yeo et al.,
2011). These two criteria are thought to be complementary and
broadly consistent with each other, although they do not always
yield identical results (Laird et al., 2013).
A third quite different principle that can be used to deﬁne a
network is through the tendency of a set of regions to be deac-
tivated (i.e., less active than when the participant is at rest) by
a class of cognitive tasks (Shulman et al., 1997b). This is how
the DMN was originally deﬁned (Raichle et al., 2001). Regions
involved in the DMN have also be deﬁned: (a) on the basis of pos-
itive resting connectivity between regions in the network, and (b)
on the basis of negative correlation (“anti-correlation”) with other
regions as revealed by resting functional connectivity. These three
ways of deﬁning the DMN (deactivation, positive correlation, and
anti-correlation) are broadly consistent and regarded as comple-
mentary (Fox et al., 2005; Raichle and Snyder, 2007; Buckner et al.,
2008; Uddin et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna, 2012).
The deﬁnition we take as primary for both the DMN and the
TPN is their anti-correlation. This follows the original deﬁnition
of these networks (Fox et al., 2005). An illustration of the two
networks, deﬁned in this way, can be seen in Figure 1. Figure 1
also illustrates a recent state-of-the-art division of the entire cor-
tex into seven networks based on functional coupling between
regions, i.e., positive resting connectivity (Yeo et al., 2011). The
mapping between Yeo et al.’s (2011) positive connectivity maps
and the anti-correlated networks is illustrated in greater detail in
Figures 2 and 3, for the DMN and TPN, respectively. This reveals
the need for some revision of early characterizations of the anti-
correlated networks. The broad characterization of the DMN has
remained quite stable, and is reasonably consistent using positive
and negative correlation criteria (Figure 2). However, this is not
the case for the TPN (Figure 3). It was originally thought (Fox
et al., 2005) that the DMN was anti-correlated primarily with the
dorsal attention network (Corbetta et al., 1998). However, sub-
sequent work using more data-driven methods (Fox et al., 2005;
Chang and Glover, 2009; Chai et al., 2012; Jack et al., 2012) has
revealed that the TPN overlaps parts of both the dorsal atten-
tion network and the fronto-parietal control network (Vincent
et al., 2008). Figure 3 also illustrates clear overlap between the
TPN and the resting state network which Yeo et al. (2011) identify
with the ventral attention network (Fox et al., 2006). The ven-
tral attention network is recruited during a variety of demanding
attention tasks, however, its precise functional characterization
is still subject to debate. It has been characterized as involved
primarily in the reorienting of attention, however, more recent
analysis suggests that the network as identiﬁed by Yeo et al. (2011)
can be better characterized as being involved in detecting and
responding to task-relevant stimuli (Kubit and Jack, 2013). Hence,
particularly for the TPN, it is important to note there is inconsis-
tency between the criteria for deﬁning networks. It appears that
DMN is in tension with a set of regions (i.e., the TPN) that lie
within a number of different cortical networks that can be dis-
tinguished and deﬁned by distinct proﬁles of positive functional
coupling.
THE DEFAULT MODE NETWORK
Until quite recently, the function of the DMN was regarded as
largely mysterious. In a comprehensive review, Buckner et al.
(2008) noted that “a unique challenge for understanding the func-
tions of the brain’s default network is that the system is most
active in passive settings and during tasks that direct attention
away from external stimuli.” While these and other researchers
acknowledged the difﬁculty in deﬁnitively identifying a function
for the DMN, nonetheless a consensus view began to emerge: that
the tension between the TPN and DMN could be best explained by
a distinction between two kinds of attention, namely externally vs.
internally directed cognitive processing. This viewwas encouraged
by some inﬂuential early work (Gusnard et al., 2001), by the mis-
taken view that the DMN was anti-correlated with regions whose
primary function was external attention (Fox et al., 2005), and by
the paucity of evidence that any externally oriented task could pro-
duce activation of the DMN above resting levels (but see Iacoboni
et al., 2004).
It is clear that the DMN is reliably engaged by some tasks that
involve attention to internal stimuli. Notable examples include:
autobiographical recall and prospection (imagining future events;
Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng and Grady,
2010), self-related processing (Mitchell et al., 2006), and emotion
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FIGURE 1 | Different criteria for defining brain networks. Functional
networks shown on the left hemisphere of the PALS atlas (top – lateral
view above, bottom – medial view). Left panels show anti-correlated
networks derived from resting state data. The TPN is shown in blue, the
DMN in orange/yellow. Darker colors correspond to anti-correlated
networks using a global (whole brain) regressor, brighter colors without a
global regressor (i.e., most strongly anticorrelated areas). Maps derived
from data and methods described in Jack et al. (2012). Right panels show
the seven network stable solution derived by Yeo et al. (2011) on the basis
of positive correlations in resting state data. Area shown in black
corresponds to a cross-section through sub-cortical structures, not
mapped by Yeo et al. (2011).
FIGURE 2 |The default mode network (DMN). Strong overlap in the DMN
representation based on anti-correlations and positive correlations in resting
state data. Left panels show just the DMN derived from anti-correlations in
orange/yellow. Right panels show networks derived byYeo et al. (2011) with
substantial overlap. Borders of anti-correlated regions are carried over from
the left panels. Key toYeo et al. (2011) networks is shown in the middle of the
ﬁgure. Labels denote best current understanding of the primary functions of
key parts of the DMN.
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FIGURE 3 |The task-positive network (TPN).TheTPN representation based
on anti-correlations corresponds to multiple networks deﬁned by positive
correlations. Left panels show just theTPN derived from anti-correlations in
blue. Right panels show networks derived byYeo et al. (2011) with substantial
overlap. Borders of anti-correlated regions are carried over from the left
panels. Key toYeo et al. (2011) networks is shown in the middle of the ﬁgure.
Labels denote best current understanding of the primary functions of key
parts of theTPN.
self-regulation (Ochsner et al., 2005). However, the characteriza-
tion of theDMNas being primarily involved in internal processing
glosses over other highly reliable ﬁndings which associate DMN
activation with externally oriented tasks. These types of externally
oriented tasks fall into two broad categories, which correspond to
a fractionation of the DMN which can be observed both through
meta-analysis of activation ﬁndings (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010)
and by resting connectivity analysis (Uddin et al., 2009). More
dorsal parts of the midline structures of the DMN,medial parietal
and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) are reliably associ-
ated with thinking about the mental states of others, including
both their emotional and cognitive (e.g., belief) states (Amodio
and Frith, 2006; Schilbach et al., 2008; Van Overwalle, 2009).
In contrast, ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is associ-
ated with representing the value of external objects (Grabenhorst
and Rolls, 2011). Moral decision making tasks, which are again
predominantly external in focus, are associated with activity in
both dorsal and ventral parts of the DMN (Greene et al., 2004;
Bzdok et al., 2012; Koenigs et al., 2012; Jack, in press). Since these
ﬁndings appear to be inconsistent with the commonly held view
that the tension between the TPN and DMN reﬂects a tension
between external and internal attention, we will temporarily set
aside that view and return to it in a later section. Instead, the
characterization of the DMN we offer here will be guided by
a broad view of tasks that are positively associated with DMN
engagement.
The DMN may be seen as having two primary circuits. The
ﬁrst is the dorsal portions of the midline structures and the right
temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ), which are most clearly asso-
ciated with mentalizing, that is, thinking about our own and
other’s mental states (Ochsner et al., 2005; Amodio and Frith,
2006; Schilbach et al., 2008; Van Overwalle, 2009). It is impor-
tant to note that the anatomy of this mentalizing circuit is distinct
from other regions that make distinct contributions to social
cognition. These include: a set of regions primarily involved in
perceptual processing of social stimuli such as faces and bodies
(Wiggett et al., 2009) and the mirror neuron network, which is
involved in both executing and observing actions, and thought to
underlie our ability to mimic the actions of others. In contrast,
the mentalizing system is thought to be involved not in emo-
tional contagion, but in the cognitive representation of emotion
(Lindquist et al., 2012).
The second of the primary DMN circuits is the more ven-
tral portions of the midline structures, which are associated with
self-related processing, autobiographical memory and prospec-
tion, cognitive representation of emotion, representation of
value/reward, emotion self-regulation, and autonomic process-
ing. We endorse the characterization of these processes offered
by a recent review (Roy et al., 2012), which concludes: “The
vmPFC is not necessary for affective responses per se, but is
critical when affective responses are shaped by conceptual infor-
mation about speciﬁc outcomes. The vmPFC thus functions as
a hub that links concepts with brainstem systems capable of
coordinating organism-wide emotional behavior, a process we
describe in terms of the generation of affective meaning.” The
severe consequence of poor function in this circuit has long
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been known through the highly inﬂuential work of Damasio
(1994) looking at patients with vmPFC damage. These patients
exhibit severely impaired social, moral, and decision making
behavior, cannot hold down a job, and tend to be shunned
by family members, even though they often have high IQs
(Anderson et al., 1999). More recent work with moral decision
making tasks indicates that they also tend to favor a course of
action, which appears to promote the best overall outcome, even
when that involves denying individual rights and directly harming
others. In other words, they are more utilitarian in their thinking
(Koenigs et al., 2007).
With regard to leadership roles, the DMN is the basis for rela-
tional roles in which the leader makes sense of their own and
other people’s emotions and helps to construct a sense of purpose
or vision for the group. Given that both subsystems of the DMN
are typically deactivated by tasks that activate the TPN, it is trou-
bling to imagine the potential consequences of placing too strong
an emphasis on adopting leadership roles that recruit the TPN.
THE TASK-POSITIVE NETWORK
The broadly deﬁned functions of the TPN are agreed in the lit-
erature, although some debate persists about the best way to
characterize the function of the ﬁner grained functionally cou-
pled networks which it overlaps (Kubit and Jack, 2013). The
TPN is activated, and the DMN deactivated, by wide variety
of non-social tasks including those involving focused attention,
working memory, language, logical reasoning, mathematical rea-
soning, and causal/mechanical reasoning (Shulman et al., 1997a,b;
Duncan and Owen, 2000; Fox et al., 2005; Owen et al., 2005; Van
Overwalle, 2011). While the TPN includes some regions of the
brain associated with social processes such as the mirror neu-
ron network, it is distinct from the mentalizing network of the
DMN both in its location and in the types of tasks that activate
it (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Van Overwalle, 2011; Jack
et al., 2012). The TPN includes parts of the dorsal attention sys-
tem (Fox et al., 2005), the fronto-parietal control network (Vincent
et al., 2008), and the ventral attention network (Fox et al., 2006;
Kubit and Jack, 2013). Using more relaxed criteria, it can also
be seen to overlap the somatomotor network (Figure 3). These
networks are broadly associated with focus on, and execution of,
well-deﬁned tasks that are non-social in nature. Jack (in press)
deﬁnes the TPN as “analytical–empirical–critical reasoning, such
as mechanical reasoning.” Given our current understanding of
the TPN, leadership roles associated with this network are those
focused on ﬁnancial planning, metrics, forecasting, problem solv-
ing, as well as strategic social engagement for the purpose of task
achievement.
THE OPPOSING DOMAINS HYPOTHESIS
As discussed, it is generally accepted in the cognitive neuroscience
literature that the DMN and the TPN are anti-correlated (Greicius
et al., 2003; Fox et al., 2005; Fransson, 2005; Golland et al., 2007;
Tian et al., 2007; Buckner et al., 2008; Jack et al., 2013b). It is also
broadly agreed that a variety of cognitively demanding non-social
tasks tend to activate the TPN and deactivate the DMN. There has
been less agreement about how best to cognitively characterize the
tension between these networks.
The opposing domains hypothesis predicts that activation of
the DMN or the TPN is a result of the type of thinking a per-
son engages in to order to complete a given task, regardless of
whether the task is externally or internally oriented (e.g., relates
to perceived stimuli vs. to information recalled from memory).
Personality factors play a role in the deployment of these net-
works, particularly for tasks where the most productive strategy is
unclear or ambiguous. Nonetheless, it is thought that all neurotyp-
ical individuals are capable of ﬂexibly deploying these networks,
hence tasks which have a clear affordance for one type of pro-
cessing over the other will tend to engage the relevant network.
When a person engages in a cognitively demanding non-social
task, they will tend to deﬁne their role as having an analytic focus.
In this circumstance, both the opposing domains hypothesis and
other accounts predict the TPN will tend to be activated and the
DMN deactivated. When a person engages in a task that involves
mentalizing and/or thinking about affective meaning, and as a
result, deﬁnes their role as social and/or relational, the oppos-
ing domains hypothesis predicts the DMN will be activated and
the TPN deactivated. This prediction, which entails that an indi-
vidual’s analytic abilities are suppressed when they are empath-
ically engaged with people, is unique to the opposing domains
account.
Jack et al. (2012) used functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) to record brain activity when participants were engaged
in social vs. mechanical/analytic tasks. The social tasks required
participants to answer questions about the beliefs and attitudes of
the characters in emotionally and morally laden text passages or
video clips. The mechanical tasks required participants to com-
plete science puzzles, presented either as written passages, or as
video clips taken from the Video Encyclopedia of Physics. A rest
condition was included, in which participants were only asked to
stare at a ﬁxation point, for the purpose of establishing a resting
baseline against which both activations and deactivations could be
observed.
The ﬁndings showed that the neural activation during the
social tasks, speciﬁcally the activation of the rTPJ, medial pari-
etal/posterior cingulate and the medial prefrontal cortex, was
accompanied by the deactivation of the neural networks respon-
sible for mechanical reasoning, speciﬁcally, the superior frontal
sulcus, lateral prefrontal cortex, and the intraparietal sulcus. Con-
trols were put in place for task and perceptual demands to rule out
the alternate hypothesis that the TPN vs. DMN dichotomy can be
best accounted for by internal vs. external attention.
Jack et al. (2012) conclude that the anti-correlation between
the TPN and DMN “reﬂects a powerful human tendency to dif-
ferentiate between conscious persons and inanimate objects in
both our attitudes and modes of interaction” (p. 396). Further
work (Jack et al., 2013b) looking at humanizing vs. objectifying
(where people tend to be viewed as objects) narratives about peo-
ple provides additional support for the view that these networks
are not driven by the surface characteristics of the stimuli, but
rather reﬂect ﬂexible cognitive stances which can be deployed
depending on the attitudes and role adopted by the individual.
The implications of these ﬁndings for leadership and organiza-
tional behavior are vast. The duality of task and relationship;
inanimate and animate; and social and non-social can be found in
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the personality, motivation, group dynamics, socialization, con-
ﬂict, trust, decision making, mindfulness, and moral reasoning
literatures.
A further wrinkle to this account is important to note. While
it is very well documented that the TPN and DMN tend to be
antagonistic, both at rest and during the performance of tasks, the
dichotomy between these networks is not absolute. They can be
simultaneously activated and work in cooperation with each other
(Fornito et al., 2012; Meyer et al., 2012). Both theory and observa-
tion indicates that this occurs when participants are engaged in a
type of social reasoning that is highly instrumental, and lacking in
genuine empathy. For instance, this pattern is seen more in indi-
viduals who are prone to Machiavellian thinking (Bagozzi et al.,
2013). It is also the neural signature that is seen when people are
animalistically dehumanized, rather than objectiﬁed (Jack et al.,
2013b).
This recruitment of the TPN during social cognition is likely
due to a person thinking critically, strategically, or mechanically
about people. Hence, it does not appear to be the case that we
can be both genuinely empathetic and analytic at the same time.
Instead, our view is that when these networks work co-operatively
with each other (Fornito et al., 2012), they realize a different type
of cognitive processing from either genuine empathy or pure ana-
lytic reasoning. When we engage the analytic network alongside
the DMN, this corresponds to a mode of social interaction that
is alienating to others. This is reﬂected in everyday language.
When we say that people are being “manipulative” or “calculat-
ing,” the metaphor may make sense because they are using TPN
brain regions involved in ﬁne motor control and/or mathemat-
ical reasoning to operate on social representations (Meyer et al.,
2012). Although this cognitive mode involves a sense of social
or emotional distance, it is clearly useful to think “strategically”
or “politically” in this way on occasion. This is reﬂected in the
observation that strategic social reasoning plays a crucial role in
leadership research. For example, Boyatzis and Goleman (2007)
make the distinction between emotional intelligence (EI) and
social intelligence (SI). EI is deﬁned as the ability of a person
to recognize, understand, and use emotional information about
oneself or others (Boyatzis, 2006). We expect these competencies
will tend to recruit both theDMNand the TPN in tandem. By con-
trast, SI competencies are non-task focused, for example, acting
with compassion, and would therefore primarily recruit the DMN
(Boyatzis and Goleman, 2007). Interestingly, Boyatzis et al. (2006)
predicted that SI competencies are linked to the parasympathetic
nervous system, while focusing on tasks and instrumental use of
EI is linked to the sympathetic nervous system. This would suggest
that EI competencieswould relate to theTPN.Research is currently
underway to explore what overlap exists between the divisions of
the autonomic nervous system and the TPN and DMN. While the
evidence is far from conclusive, early ﬁndings based on recent
meta-analyses (see, for example, Beissner et al., 2013) indicate
that the TPN is more closely linked to the sympathetic ner-
vous system while the DMN is closer to the parasympathetic
nervous system. The labels in Figures 2 and 3 indicate regions
which show the closest correspondence between the DMN and
TPN and regions implicated in autonomic nervous function
(Eisenberger and Cole, 2012).
OPPOSING ROLES OF LEADERSHIP
LEADERSHIP ROLES
A role is a constellation of behavior and expectations enacted in a
social situation. Mead (1934) claimed that roles were embedded in
the situation and thereforewere constantly emerging and evolving.
As a sociologist and helping to formulate the interactionist theory
of roles, Mead (1934) emphasized the expectations of others in
the forming and reforming of roles. In this way, roles are distinct
fromstyle. Leadership style describes a dispositional comportment
of a person as a leader that can vary by situation and demand.
Leadership style contributes to role enactment as Biddle (1986)
explained from a functionalist theory of roles.
In leadership, a role provides a guide to one’s behavior and
helps new role occupants become socialized into how they could
or should act in a way consistent with the norms and culture of
an organization. A leadership role of a person emerges in response
to the expectations of others around the leader, especially the fol-
lowers, and the leader’s own style/s, competencies, and values
(Boyatzis, 1982). This process of role emergence as a result of the
interaction between expectations and behavior has been explained
by cognitive role theory (LeMay, 1999).
There appears to be two distinct components of the enactment
of leadership roles that parallel the distinction between the TPN
and the DMN: task achievement and relationship development.
We will place the evolution of this duality of leadership roles in
historical context.
FROM TAYLOR TO BASS APPROACHES TO LEADERSHIP ROLES
The centrality of tasks to a leader’s role was evident in Cowley’s
(1928) deﬁnition of a leader: “an individual who is moving in a
particular direction and who succeeds in inducing others to follow
him. . .A leader then, is a person who is going somewhere, who has
a motive, who has a program.” (p. 145–146). In short, without a
task, leaders do not exist.
Fredrick Taylor’s scientiﬁc management movement empha-
sized the task aspect of leadership. Followers were viewed as
“machines” to be used efﬁciently by the leader. In other words,
by treating humans as inanimate objects subject to analyti-
cal analysis, the role of a leader in the scientiﬁc management
era was largely reliant on recruitment of the TPN rather than
the DMN (Jack et al., 2013b) and therefore discouraged the
leader from fostering more meaningful social–emotional con-
nections with followers. The introduction of the “human” side
of leadership in the late 1930s gave rise to a multitude of
leadership frameworks that reﬂected the scientiﬁc management
(task) – human relations (relationship) duality. These frameworks
include the autocratic (task)-democratic (relationship) contin-
uum (Tannenbaum and Schmidt, 1958), the Ohio State Leader-
ship Studies on structure (task) and relationship (Shartle, 1950;
Fleishman, 1953; Halpin and Winer, 1957), and the Michigan
Leadership Studies (Katz et al., 1950) of a production orientation
and an employee orientation.
ATTEMPTING TO INTEGRATE TASK AND RELATIONSHIP ROLES FROM
THE 1950s TO THE 1970s
When symbolic interaction theory transferred from social to orga-
nizational psychology, leadership theory changed to require both
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relationship building and task attainment. This development par-
allels the duality of the neural opposing domains: relational
leadership competencies are facilitated by the DMN, while the
task competencies are facilitated by the TPN. Bales (1958) was
instrumental in this theoretical shift in the leadership literature
with his claim that a task-oriented group requires two types of
leaders to maximize effectiveness; one leader to attend to the
task functions of the group (instrumental leader) and another
to attend to the emotional needs of the group (expressive leader).
The suggestion that two leaders are required in a group stood
in stark contrast to the idea that all leadership roles could be
carried out by one individual. Given that we now know that
the neural networks underlying these two roles are antagonis-
tic, having two leaders in a group presents what initially appears
to be a reasonable strategy for relieving the task–relationship
tension.
By the 1960s, a consensus began to form that building relation-
ships with followers was a fundamental component of leadership
and a critical ingredient in task achievement. Leadership theorists
become interested in developing strategies that would enable lead-
ers to integrate these two fundamental leadership roles. The early
Ohio State Leadership Studies (Fleishman, 1953) conﬁrmed the
conceptual distinction between task-oriented and relationship-
oriented leadership and developed a measurement tool for each.
Following from this work, task-oriented leadership has been iden-
tiﬁed as being concerned with production (Blake and Mouton,
1964), goal achievement (Cartwright and Zander, 1960; Bowers
and Seashore, 1966), labor allocation, enforcement of sanctions
(McGregor, 1960), and creating a context and structure for fol-
lowers (Shartle, 1950; Fleishman, 1953; Halpin and Winer, 1957).
At the individual level, task-oriented leaders were said to have a
high need for achievement (McClelland, 1961; Wofford, 1970), to
be achievement oriented (Indvik, 1986), and to be cold and aloof
to signal their preference for psychological distance from follow-
ers (Blau and Scott, 1962). Interestingly, these descriptions are not
only consistent with the role of the TPN discussed earlier, but also
allude to the suppression of the DMN – in particular, they ﬁt well
with our observation that the socially distancing effect of dehu-
manizing is associated with a shift from DMN to TPN engagement
(Jack et al., 2013b).
Conversely, relationship-oriented leaders were described as
being focused on follower well-being (Hemphill, 1950), con-
cerned with developing and maintaining relationships (Hersey
and Blanchard, 1969), to be more democratic as opposed to
autocratic (Bass, 1990), and as placing value on friendships,
open communication, and mutual trust. These psychological fea-
tures ﬁt a proﬁle of DMN activation and TPN deactivation –
the neural signature associated with thinking about the expe-
riences of others (Jack et al., 2012) and humanizing (Jack et al.,
2013b). Individuals who are humanized experience positive emo-
tions, whereas those who are dehumanized experience negative
emotions (Bastian and Haslam, 2011). Correspondingly, research
has shown that relationship-oriented leaders are associated with
higher job satisfaction and lower turnover in organizations (Bass,
1990; Yukl, 2006).
Yukl (1999) provides themost recent taxonomyof task and rela-
tion oriented leader roles. He also distinguished a third dimension
in his taxonomy, labeled “change orientation” which includes a
mix of task and relationship oriented roles. However, in critiquing
other’s work, Yukl (1999, 2008) notes the limitations of the task–
relationships distinction, speciﬁcally, the inconsistent empirical
results and the lack of evidence that it is indeed possible to be
high in both task and relationship competencies and that being
so is related to leadership effectiveness (Yukl, 1999). Research con-
ducted since adds support toYukl’s critique; speciﬁcally, Kaiser and
Kaplan (unpublished, as cited in Bass and Bass, 2008) found that
in a sample of managers from a consulting ﬁrm, 46% were highly
task oriented, 19% were highly relationship oriented, and only 6%
showed ﬂexibility between the two dimensions. The remaining
29% were low in both task and relationship orientation.
The distinction between task-oriented roles vs. relationship-
oriented roles presented in Yukl’s taxonomy appears to closely
parallel the distinction made between social and mechanical tasks
used to test the opposing domains hypothesis (Jack et al., 2012).
Speciﬁcally, the task-oriented tasks are, by and large, mechanical
and analytical in nature and would therefore activate the leader’s
TPN, while the relationship oriented tasks are generally social in
nature and would therefore activate the leader’s DMN.
The anti-correlation between these two networks suggests that
when a leader is focused on a task-oriented role, their ability
and desire to attend to the relationship needs of their followers
is diminished. This is not to say that leaders do not have the ability
to be both highly analytical and to build effective relationships. In
the absence of any task, it is known that the human brain naturally
cycles between activation of the TPN and activation of the DMN,
activating each several times in a period of a minute (Fox et al.,
2005). Hence, it is clearly possible to switch between networks and
possibly roles.
However, the evidence from neuroscience does suggest that
leaders cannot simultaneously attend to these distinct roles, hence
conﬂicts are likely to arise if leaders get “stuck” in one role,
which decreases their ability to switch between the two networks,
resulting in the prolonged suppression of one of the networks
and associated roles. This trade-off has been noted by a num-
ber of scholars. Most recently Yukl (2008) notes that “efforts to
improve one performance determinant may have an adverse effect
on another performance determinant. . .when leaders are preoccu-
piedwith responding to external threats (task), there is less time for
people-oriented concerns such as being supportive and developing
member skills” (pp. 711–714). The opposing domains hypothesis
provides an alternative explanation for why this trade-off occurs.
Rather than, or at least in addition to, a simple lack of time
and overall cognitive resources, the opposing domains hypoth-
esis suggests that the suppression of the opposing neural network
further exacerbates the “adverse effect on another performance
determinant.”
The antagonistic relationship between the TPN and DMN
may also help us to understand why the type of role a leader
adopts moderates the relationship between leadership role (task
vs. relationship), task performance and leadership effectiveness
respectively. Speciﬁcally, Burke (1965) found that a group’s
performance of a coding task was completed more effectively
under a production-oriented (task) leader while the shared
decision-making (task) was carried out more effectively under a
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relationship-oriented leader. The opposing domains hypothesis
offers two explanations for this ﬁnding – the ﬁrst related to the
ability of the followers to perform the task, the second related to
the leadership role that the followers’ perceived to be effective.
First, followers performed more effectively on the analyti-
cal task when the leadership role matched the neural network
activated as a result of the analytical nature of the task (the
TPN). When a relationship-oriented leadership role was used,
the leader’s behavior and focus on relationships may have acti-
vated the DMN in followers, which we now know to be associated
with lapses in attention and performance errors (McKiernan et al.,
2003; Mason et al., 2007; Fassbender et al., 2009; Pyka et al., 2009),
hence the lower performance on the analytical task. Conversely,
the shared decision task, which required interpersonal interaction
and thereforewould have activated theDMN,was performedmore
effectively under a relationship oriented leader. A relationship-
oriented leader in this task would have allowed for the follower’s
DMN to be dominant, which is the network required to perform
this task effectively. A task-oriented leader would have activated
the follower’s TPN, which would suppress the DMN resulting in
a reduction of human and ethical insight (Jack et al., 2013b, in
press) and consequently lower task performance.
Second, when completing the coding tasks the followers were
predominately engaging their TPN, hence the task-oriented lead-
ership role may have been perceived by followers to be more
effective because it was more psychologically resonant. Similarly
the relationship-oriented leadership role may have been preferred
by followers engaged in the moral decision task because of the
resonant emphasis on DMN engagement for both the task and the
leadership role.
Further evidence of the interaction between task type and
follower preference for a task vs. relationship-oriented leader is
offered by Weed et al. (1976). This study found that the only type
of task that was a signiﬁcant moderator between leadership role
and task performancewas the difﬁcult–ambiguous task.While this
studywas focused on the difﬁculty and ambiguity of the task rather
than the mechanical or social nature of the task, the authors note
that the difﬁcult–ambiguous task was the only task that involved
ethical/moral problems and therefore “the signiﬁcant ﬁndings on
this task may be partially attributable to the types of skills required
to deal with these problems” (p. 65).
Finally, Hersey and Blanchard (1969) developed the Tri-
Dimensional Leadership Model that sought to link task and
relationship oriented leadership roles to follower perceptions of
leadership effectiveness. The Tri-Dimensional Leadership Model
suggests that leaders who are highly task oriented will be per-
ceived as “effective” because they know what they want and are
able to impose this to accomplish a task without causing resent-
ment. A highly task-oriented leader will be perceived as ineffective
when followers’ perceive the leader has no conﬁdence in others, is
unpleasant, or only shows interest in short-run output. In other
words, a highly task-oriented leader will only be seen as effec-
tive if they are aware of, and attend to, relationships – rather
than dehumanizing their followers – while accomplishing the
task.
Similarly, a leader with a high relationship-orientation will be
seen as effective by followers when they perceive the leader has
implicit trust in them and is primarily concerned with develop-
ing their talents – behaviors associated with humanizing and the
DMN. They will be seen as ineffective when followers perceive
the leader to be passive and showing little care about the task at
hand – behaviors associated sustained activity of the DMN that
suppresses the TPN (Mason et al., 2007; Jack et al., 2012). These
ﬁndings extend the hypotheses derived from the Burke (1965)
study with the suggestion that regardless of a leader’s preferred
role (task-oriented or relationship oriented), the leader must be
able to switch ﬂuidly between the opposing neural networks (the
TPN and the DMN) in order to be perceived as effective by their
followers. Given this, it seems that rather than identifying the
individual difference variables and situational variables that are
associated with each style in isolation, it may be more important
to identify variables that correspond to the ability of a leader to
switch between the TPNand theDMN in order tomaximize leader
effectiveness.
DEALING WITH THE DIALECTICAL TENSION
The previous section has shown that the distinction between task
and relationship roles is evident throughout the leadership liter-
ature. In this section, we explore potential strategies to resolve,
or at least minimize the consequences of the tension that leaders
face in developing their roles to attend to task requirements and
attending to relationships as a result of the antagonism between
the TPN and the DMN.
NEURAL DISPOSITION: MATCHING THE LEADER TO THE SITUATION
As with hormonal disposition, there is some evidence to suggest
that humans have a natural disposition toward either analytical–
mechanical reasoning and therefore the TPN or social–relational
reasoning and therefore the DMN (Jack et al., 2012). While neural
disposition is a relatively nascent area, hormonal dispositions are
well documented in the literature (see Insel, 1997; Schulkin, 1999).
For example, people with higher unconscious power motives are
known to have higher resting levels of epinephrine secretion, while
people with a higher unconscious Need for Achievement appear
to have higher resting levels of vasopressin secretion (Boyatzis and
Sala, 2004; Boyatzis et al., 2006). At the behavioral level, neural
and hormonal dispositions may underlie certain personality char-
acteristics, learning styles, and perhaps preferred leadership roles
(Boyatzis and Sala, 2004).
Considering the opposing domains model, one way to address
the tension between the task and relationship leadership roles
could be to match a leader’s predisposition toward either task
or relationship to the type of task they perceive as their primary
role and responsibility. In many ways, Bales’ (1958) suggestion of
the need for two leaders was an attempt to do this. The utility of
matching a leader’s natural inclination toward either a task or rela-
tionship role to the situation has found some empirical support
in the literature. For example, Slatter (1955) found that when task
demands are high, being liked does not contribute to leadership
effectiveness and social or relational skills are not highly valued,
whereas in therapy groups, sensitivity training groups, and social
clubs socio-emotional skills were important. However, the practi-
cal results from dividing the leadership roles have been less than
ideal.
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Like the old CEO (chief executive ofﬁcer) and COO (chief
operating ofﬁcer) split, father and mother role split, CO (com-
manding ofﬁcer) and XO (executive ofﬁcer) split in the military,
this leadership role differentiation is possible but appears to be less
effective in the long-term. Attempts to have two people occupy
co-chair, or co-CEO roles have been, at best, confusing. Usu-
ally leaders in these roles cannot sustain true status and power
equalization over time. In addition, others around them may not
allow it and their expectations and preferences push for more
status differentiation, not less. Over time, one role dominates
the other, and as a result one neural network dominates brain
activation (even as an organizational norm) leading the organi-
zation down a narrow path of either problem focused decisions
with little openness to new ideas or events occurring in the larger
environment (like market shifts) OR an organization preoccupied
with environmental changes and meeting the various desires of
employees that has difﬁculty executing a strategy consistently over
time.
Differentiating the leadership role effectively allows a leader
to spend the majority of their time in one of the two neural net-
works and reduces the need to cycle between them. From the point
of view of sustained leadership effectiveness, ﬂuid cycling at rest
between the two networks is associated with good mental health
and higher IQ, whereas a lessening of the cycling between net-
works is associated with a variety of mental disorders (Broyd et al.,
2009;Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010;Anticevic et al., 2012;Whitﬁeld-
Gabrieli and Ford, 2012). While studies of the long-term effects of
privileging the engagement of one cognitive mode over the other
in task performance have yet to be done, it is plausible that a
more balanced approach is associated with better long-term men-
tal health and performance, whereas over-privileging one network
for sustained periods leads to mental exhaustion and burn-out –
two detrimental effects that are often discussed in the leader-
ship literature. Therefore, role differentiation, while presenting
an easier short-term strategy for an organization to accomplish
a balance, may prove far less productive if the individual’s role
remains constant over time.
These considerations suggest a more effective approach would
be to train and develop leaders so that they not only possess a
high level of competency in enacting both the task and relation-
ship leadership roles, but also have the ability to switch ﬂuidly
between them along an awareness of appropriate cues and con-
texts for doing so (French and Jack, in press), which also requires
a perceptual facility with perceiving when each is needed or more
appropriate. The actions to invoke a change of role are within a
leader’s purview. For example, a leader witnessing a competitor
take some of their clients or market share could see this as a need
for analytic investigation – is there is pricing difference? Are there
differences in transportation costs or delivery speed?
Similarly, a leader who is heavily into a task role (and TPN
activation) may decide that each day he/she will coach another
person to help them develop. In a within subjects study com-
paring a method of coaching with the positive emotional attractor
(PEA; i.e., coaching with compassion) vs. the more typical method
of coaching someone to ﬁx them – to the negative emotional
attractor (NEA; i.e., coaching for compliance), components of the
DMN were signiﬁcantly activated in the PEA condition more than
the NEA condition (Jack et al., 2013a). Since this neural network
allows a person to be more perceptually and cognitively open to
new ideas, it may be the process needed to help people become
open to switching and engaging both domains with ﬂuidity. By
deciding to coach one person each day (formally or informally
over coffee or a lunch), and to commit to doing it about the per-
son’s dreams, vision or values, the leader commits to switching
into the relationship role at least once a day and activating the
DMN in both himself/herself and the other person. Over time
and practice, the switching between the task and relationship roles
would likely become easier and help the leader develop more cues
as to when one role is more appropriate or possible than the other.
Not quite as simple as changing hats or shoes, but it could become
as convenient.
NEURAL RESOURCE EFFICIENCY
The opposing domains hypothesis could be framed as presenting
a form of “trade-off” between adopting roles favoring task-
related leadership activities and therefore activating the TPN and
suppressing the DMN and adopting roles favoring relationship
building activities and therefore activating theDMNand suppress-
ing the TPN. In this framing, neurological activation is essentially
a form of resource that leaders distribute between the task and
relationship roles to attain or increase their effectiveness. When a
leader expends more neural resources attending to relationships,
they consequently have fewer resources to invest in the task role
and vice versa. It may be possible that we can change the rate
or efﬁciency of the leader’s neural resources, thereby minimizing
the extent of activation required to successfully complete the task.
Because the TPN and the DMN are antagonistic, minimizing the
degree of activation in one network also serves to proportionally
decrease the suppression of the opposing network (McKiernan
et al., 2003; Pyka et al., 2009).
Task-positive network competencies
We expect that leaders with a high level of cognitive intelligence
(g) will show greater ability in analytical or mechanical type tasks.
They are also more likely to perceive the need for an analytic
leadership role focusing on the TPN and to adopt this role in
an organization. When faced with an analytical or mechanical
task, we expect leaders with high levels of cognitive intelligence
will require less “effort” or neurological resources to successfully
complete an analytical or mechanical task than leaders with lower
levels of cognitive intelligence (Graham et al., 2010). Similarly, we
expect that when faced with an analytical task requiring the strate-
gic use of emotional information, leaders with high EI will require
less cognitive effort to engage followers than leaders with low EI.
Leaders with higher levels of EI can access the emotional infor-
mation more easily than those with low EI, even if it is in service
of an analytic task. This helps to clarify that emotional labor can
be in service of either a task demand or an emotional and social
demand.
A leader who shows a high level of familiarity or specialized
competence in a given task should also require less neurological
resources than leaders with a lower level of familiarity or special-
ized competence. A high level of task competence will result in
the leader experiencing the task with less intensity resulting in a
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lower level of activation in the TPN. By the work appearing more
routine to a leader using an appropriate role, it may allow a leader
to switch roles more easily. Holding competence, experiences, and
intelligence constant, more difﬁcult tasks will require more neu-
rological resources than easy tasks (McKiernan et al., 2003; Mason
et al., 2007; Pyka et al., 2009).
Default mode network competencies
In similar vein to the reasoning discussed above, when faced with a
social or relational task, we expect leaders with high SI (as opposed
toEI – seeBoyatzis andGoleman,2007) to require less neurological
resources to successfully complete a relational task relative to those
leaders with low SI. We would also expect that leaders who possess
high levels of empathetic concern and compassion tobe in a similar
position. These leaders are also more likely to perceive the need
for and adopt a relational leadership role.
SWITCHING BETWEEN THE TPN AND DMN
While the idea that a task can be classiﬁed as either analytical or
social is useful for theoretical purposes, as with most dichotomies,
the distinction is rarely so clean-cut in practice. In reality, and par-
ticularly in the context of leadership, all tasks have a relational
component and an analytical component. Leadership almost
always requires consideration of both analytical tasks (TPN) and
relationships (DMN), therefore we suspect that the greater ability
a leader has to switch between these two modes of reasoning the
more effective they will be as a leader. We suspect that minimiz-
ing the suppression of the opposing network will make it easier,
faster, and less costly for the leader to switch between the two
networks. For example, we have already argued that leaders with
certain social competencies require less cognitive effort to com-
plete a social task than those without these competencies, resulting
in less activation of the DMN and less suppression of the TPN.
This reduction in the difference or gap between the two networks
should make switching between the two networks faster and less
costly.
Along with the ability to switch between the two opposing net-
works, which we argued may require a reduction in intensity of
the dominant network, we also expect the ability to appropriately
time the shift from task to relationship to be important both in
terms of minimizing disruption for followers and for maximizing
the effectiveness of the shift. For example, knowing that activa-
tion of the DMN suppresses our analytical–mechanical reasoning
abilities (Jack et al., 2012), and that activation of the DMN dur-
ing analytic tasks is associated with mind-wandering and lapses
of attention (Mason et al., 2007; Fassbender et al., 2009), it would
appear unwise for a leader to engage followers in activities requir-
ing social or relational reasoning at a time when it is important or
urgent to maintain analytic focus. Similarly, in situations requir-
ing social or relational reasoning, for example, during the group’s
formation period, introducing task-focused activities may inhibit
relationship development in the group.
The timing of the switch may also have implications for the
timing of feedback. Based on the opposing domains hypothesis,
we would expect that the closer the time period between action
and feedback, the more congruence there should be between the
type of feedback and the type of task. For example, if feedback is
being given while a person is performing an analytical task, the
feedback given should be analytical or technical in nature because
this is the type of feedback is consistent with the neural network
within which the receiver is engaged. If the leader wishes to give
feedback that requires the follower to engage in social or rela-
tional reasoning, he/she would be better to wait until the receiver
has disengaged from the analytical task. The same can be said
for giving task-related feedback in an emotionally charged situa-
tion. Gottman et al. (2002) documented something every married
or partnered person should know. When your spouse or part-
ner is angry and yelling at you, this is not the time to reply by
analyzing the situation in emotional distant terms. It does not
help and in fact, as Gottman et al. (2002) document, inﬂames the
situation.
Finally, given that the decision to switch from one cognitive
domain to another requires reasoning about the emotional state
of self and others, we would expect that leaders with greater DMN
abilities are more likely to be able to successfully time the shifts
than leaders who lack such abilities.
In sum, by using the evidence of these antagonistic neural net-
works and recent research on activating each of them, we can
hypothesize that that most effective leadership requires a combi-
nation of three facilitating factors: (a) a decrease in the switching
time (or cycle time) between these networks; (b) training people
to high levels of competence in enacting the roles requiring each
network, so decreasing the cognitive effort required and hence the
degree of deactivation of the opposing network; and (c) training
leaders to recognize and perceive contexts and cues which require
a switch between modes, so they do not remain “stuck in set” and
apply an ineffective cognitive strategy for the task at hand (e.g., by
privileging analytic thinking when faced with an ethical decision,
or intuitive thinkingwhen facedwith a logical taskwhere creativity
is not helpful).
To make this happen, we conjecture that people would have to
be trained inmultiple techniques that invoke a tippingpoint. These
techniques would function somewhat like cognitive behavioral
therapy, helping leaders to identify external (e.g., follower thoughts
and emotional state) and internal (e.g., own thoughts and emo-
tional state) cues and respond appropriately. In particular, people
may need to develop the ability to calm the system and lower the
intensity when there is a danger they are becoming “stuck in set” –
whether that involves preoccupation with social/emotional con-
cerns (over-privileging the DMN) or an overly narrow task focus
(over-privileging the TPN).
This emphasis contrasts with current beliefs that to motivate
we must increase energy and incentives (whether positive or neg-
ative). While that approach may preclude the dualistic swing
between these two cognitive modes, and the occasionally con-
ﬂicting considerations raised by each, it also presents a larger
danger: losing sight of important insights, either emotional or
analytic. Additionally, the ability to sense the optimal timing and
context for switches may also be a critical component in under-
standing leadership effectiveness. For example, in the context of
learning a new task, interruptions can be extremely costly, not
only in terms of task outcomes (errors) but also in the ability to
“pick up where you left off.” Once a person has gained a higher
level of mastery, interruptions will be less costly and following the
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interruption, the person will be able to re-engage with the task
faster.
Prior research on the intensity of emotions suggests that in
order to move a person from a negative emotional state (NEA) to
a positive emotional state (PEA), the intensity of the emotionmust
be reduced to reach a tipping point (Boyatzis, 2013). It seems rea-
sonable to suggest that a similar principlemay existwhen switching
between the TPN and the DMN. Boyatzis (2013) argues that when
people are in the PEA they are “more perceptually open and accu-
rate in perceptions of others” (p. 1978; see also Fredrickson and
Branigan, 2005; Boyatzis, 2006), which is consistent with the work
of the DMN in allowing individuals to engage in reasoning about
the emotions of others. In contrast, the NEA is said to be linked to
human survival, particularly to defend against threats. NEA also
balances “unchecked optimism” through suppressing the DMN,
which has been linked to poor investment decisions (Gibson and
Sanbonmatsu, 2004) – an analytical task that would require acti-
vation of the TPN rather than the DMN. The opposing domains
model suggests theNEA’s ability to balance unchecked optimism is
achieved through both activating the TPN required for analytical
reasoning and suppressing the DMN, which is largely responsible
for the overly optimistic state.
The link between the PEA–NEA and the DMN–TPN is also
reﬂected in Fiedler’s (1986) cognitive resources theory. Fiedler and
McGuire (1987, as cited in Bass and Bass, 2008) found that under
non-stressful conditions, leaders with ﬂuid intelligence (IQ) per-
formbetter than leaderswith crystallized intelligence (experience);
however under stressful conditions, leaders with crystallized intel-
ligence performed better. Cognitive resource theory posits that
the reason for this distinction is that under stressful conditions,
a leader with ﬂuid intelligence will rely on intellectual solutions
to a task even when such solutions are inappropriate. In other
words, under stressful conditions, a leader is “stuck” in the TPN
and also in the NEA due to the stress condition, which limits their
ability to switch into the DMN and the PEA, which enables them
to explore more creative and non-intellectual solutions. Leaders
with crystallized intelligence (intelligence based on past experi-
ence and learning) are likely to experience the same situation with
less intensity, thus these leaders will be: (1) closer to the NEA–PEA
tipping point; and (2) more able to switch between the TPN and
the DMN.
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT MAPPING BRAIN NETWORKS
ONTO LEADERSHIP ROLES
In this article, we have focused on mapping a duality which has
long been noted at the behavioral level, between different lead-
ership roles, onto a duality in the brain, highlighted by recent
research in neuroscience. There appears to be a very promising
mapping between these two domains, which suggests a fundamen-
tal neurophysiological basis for the observed duality in leadership
roles. At the same time, we acknowledge that there is a con-
siderable distance between neurophysiological observations and
leadership behavior. Hence, more research is needed to ﬁrmly
establish the links we highlight, and to elaborate and extend the
model sketched here. Our main goal has been to highlight these
links as a very promising avenue for further research. With an
eye to this future research, in this section, we respond to three
speciﬁc questions that naturally arise in response to our proposed
mapping.
First, the DMN has been found to exist in many species
(Mantini et al., 2011). Further, in humans its function serves as
basic index of level of consciousness, even in non-communicative
brain-damaged patients (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010). Given that
this network appears to have such basic functions, it may seem
surprising that we are suggesting it plays a key role in effective
leadership, which would appear a higher level function. However,
we regard this as consistentwith our account, which is based on the
view that the default network originally evolved to play a basic role
in visceral awareness and emotion self-regulation, and that these
functions expanded and evolved so that in the human this cortex
additionally supports complex representations of value and the
mental states of others (Jack et al., 2012, 2013b, in press). This ﬁts
with evidence that the default network is considerably expanded
in the human compared to other species, even when its size is
considered relative to overall cortical volume – which is massively
expanded in the human compared to other primates (Jack et al.,
in press; Figure 1).
More broadly, our review indicates that we see the default
network as critically involved in self-management, in particular
mindfulness, motivation, and affective meaning. We see relational
aspects of leadership as an extension of these functions which
arises through coupling of them with our capacity to metalize. In
summary, we suggest it quite natural to view the relational aspects
of effective leadership as a skillful cognitive blending of our basic
capacities for emotional self-regulation and social cognition. This
view sits very well with what is known about the function and
evolution of the DMN, and is not contradicted by ﬁndings which
indicate the DMN plays a role in more basic functions.
Second, we admit and welcome the possibility that there are
likely to be additional mechanisms, beyond the DMN/TPN dual-
ity we highlight, which are critical for understanding leadership.
For example, we have highlighted a duality which places two much
discussed systems involved in social cognition in opposition: the
mirror neuron system lies within the TPN, and hence there is
a general tendency for it to be deactivated when the metaliz-
ing system of the DMN is activated, and vice-versa. The mirror
neuron system is thought to play a role in “emotional conta-
gion” (Hatﬁeld et al., 1994) – a key mechanism used by leadership
scholars to explain the transfer of emotion between leader and
follower (Bono and Ilies, 2006; Johnson, 2008; see also Sy et al.,
2005) and from followers to the leader (Dasborough et al., 2009).
Additionally, parts of both the mirror neuron network and the
DMN were activated in older executives when remembering spe-
ciﬁc moments with resonant vs. dissonant leaders in their past
(Boyatzis et al., 2012). In summary, it is not our claim that the
DMN/TPN dichotomy highlighted here represents an exhaustive
description of the neural processes involved in effective leader-
ship. We look forward to future research that may clarify different
types of neural interaction. In particular, we acknowledge the
importance of looking at ways in the DMN and TPN work coop-
eratively in addition to our focus here on the“default” tendency for
them towork competitively (Fornito et al., 2012). Such cooperative
interactions between the networks need not always be anti-
social in effect, although we document evidence above that some
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modes of cooperation are associated with a greater sense of social
distance.
Finally, the methodological concern might be raised that our
analysis depends on reverse inference (Poldrack, 2011). That is,
since brain imaging evidence is essentially correlational in data,
it is not clear that the DMN and TPN are essential to the spec-
iﬁed roles in effective leadership. We acknowledge this concern,
which applies to all neuroimaging data. One important way to
mitigate faulty inferences of this type is to conduct broad anal-
yses of the literature in order to justify the claimed association
between a speciﬁc brain area and a speciﬁc function (Poldrack,
2011). Another important step is to conduct critical tests of the
hypothesized account against other accounts.
We have taken both these steps, using both meta-analysis (Jack
et al., in press) and critical tests of our theory (Jack et al., 2012,
2013b) to justify our view that the DMN vs. TPN dichotomy
reﬂects a tension between empathetic vs. analytic reasoning, as
opposed to the more broadly stated view that it reﬂects a ten-
sion between internal vs. external attention. Nonetheless, we
agree that further testing is wanted. Ideal tests would involve
directly up or down-regulating one of the networks, or mod-
ifying the ability to switch between them, and then assessing
the impact on naturalistic leadership behavior. As noted, there
is already evidence suggesting that patients with vmPFC dam-
age perform poorly in relational leadership roles (Anderson et al.,
1999), however it would be ideal to manipulate neural process-
ing and study effects within individuals. While this is challenging
to do directly, some more indirect tests along these lines may
be possible. For instance, oxytocin administration appears to
up-regulate DMN function (Bethlehem et al., 2013), hence we
would predict oxytocin administration should improve perfor-
mance in relational leadership roles and deteriorate performance
in task-oriented roles. Alternatively, it has been shown that
different forms of meditation tend to either increase (focused
meditation) or decrease (non-dual awareness meditation) anti-
correlations between the DMN and TPN (Josipovic et al., 2012).
The former should increase leadership ﬂexibility (i.e., the abil-
ity to switch between different roles and perform well in both),
the latter decrease it. Exploring these and other potential manip-
ulations of neural processing is an important area for further
research.
CONCLUSION
The emergence of two distinct leadership roles, the task-oriented
leader and the relationship-oriented leader, has been documented
in the leadership literature since the 1950s (Bales, 1958). Recent
discoveries in neuroscience that the TPN, which allows us to focus
on problem-solving and analytic work, is antagonistic with the
DMN, which allows a person to be socially engaged and open to
new ideas, creates a dialectical tension that reverberates through-
out the leadership role literature and raises questions as to how
leaders can effectively fulﬁll both roles.
RESEARCH, THEORY, AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
This paper has identiﬁed a key pattern in the leadership literature
and linked this pattern to cutting edge research in the neuro-
science domain. In doing so, we have raised a number of questions
regarding our treatment of the task and relationship distinction in
the literature to date, particularly the assumption that leaders are
able to attend to both leadership roles simultaneously. Addition-
ally,wehavebeen able to add further explanation to somehistorical
ﬁndings attempting to understand the interaction between task,
leadership roles, and leadership effectiveness. Finally, we sug-
gested an array of conceptual implications that might extend our
current conceptualization and operationalization of leadership
effectiveness.
Fromapractical standpoint, this paper suggests that developing
a leader’s analytical and relational abilities may be an important
way to offset the costly effects of the antagonistic relationship
between the TPN and the DMN. Increasing a leader’s abilities
in each role should facilitate the ability faster and more ﬂuidly
between the task and relationship roles by reducing the cogni-
tive effort, and consequently the differential activation between
the TPN and the DMN, required to perform effectively in each
respective role. We believe that the ability to switch between
these networks and corresponding leadership roles may be a key
component of leadership effectiveness.
Additionally, knowing that engagement in analytical tasks
inhibits our ability to engage in social or relational reasoning
and vice versa may have important implications for organiza-
tions in terms of how they structure and order tasks that have
analytical and relational components. For example, when giving
feedback, managers should consider if the feedback is analytical
or task related in nature or interpersonal in nature and time the
delivery of that feedback accordingly. The same may be said for
the ordering of meeting agendas and the time and structure of
performance review meetings.
While this paper has focused speciﬁcally on the implications
of the opposing domains hypothesis for leadership roles, we
believe that the distinction and antagonistic relationship between
analytical–mechanical reasoning and social reasoning exists in
many other areas in the organizational behavior domain. These
areas include, but are not limited to, leadership styles, conﬂict
management, trust, and moral reasoning. For example, distinc-
tions in the literature have been made between cognitive and
relational trust (Lewis and Weigert, 1985); cognitive conﬂict and
affective conﬂict (Jehn, 1997; De Dreu and Weingart, 2003);
empathy and dehumanization (Haslam, 2006).
Relevant to the leadership domain speciﬁcally, further test-
ing is needed in order to understand if individual difference
variables play a role in facilitating the ability to switch between
the two networks. Research is currently underway to address
this question by surfacing the opposing domains at the behav-
ioral level and linking individual difference variables and abilities
to the speed at which an individual is able to switch between
tasks requiring analytical and tasks requiring relational reason-
ing. Once we have more information on this we will be able
to target these variables in leadership development training pro-
grams. Additionally, manipulation of situational characteristics
within each type of task, for example, task difﬁculty and rou-
tineness for analytical tasks, and prior relationship quality for
social tasks, will allow us to isolate the key situational variables at
play. Finally, further research on the link between hormonal sys-
tems and neurological systems would allow us to understand how
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tipping points in hormonal systems inﬂuence neurological tipping
points.
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